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The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas MORAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
Cr. 13525. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 27, 1970. 
Defendant was convicted in the Supe-
. rior Court, Orange County, William C. 
Speirs, J., for sale and possession of LSD, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that from evidence that accused sold 20 
tablets containing LSD to bureau of nar-
cotic enforcement agent and that accused 
had tablets in his possession for two 
months, the jury could infer that intention 
to sell the tablet's originated in accused's 
mind and hence entrapment as a matter of 
law was not established. 
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part. 
Traynor, C. J., and Peters and To-
briner, JJ., dissented. 
Opinion, 76 Cal.Rptr. 879, vacated. 
I. Criminal Law *,,37 
Entrapment as matter of law is not es-
tablished where there is any substantial ev-
idence in record from which it may be in-
ferred that the criminal intent to commit 
the particular offense originated in mind 
of accused. 
2. Criminal Law e=>739(1) 
From evidence that accused sold 20 
tablets containing LSD to bureau' of nar-
cotic enforcement agent and that -, ac«:used 
had tablets in his possession for two 
months, the jury could infer that intention 
to sell the tablets originated in accused's 
mind and hence entrapment as a matter of 
law was not established. 
3. Criminal Law e=>317 
Accused's failure to call informer, who 
was a participant in sale of LSD, as a wit-
ness supported inference that his testimony 
would not be favorable to accused. West's 
Ann.Evid.Code, § 412. 
4. Criminal Law *"569 
Accused's burden to prove entrapment 
is not subject to statute requiring prosecu-
tion to establish accused's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, for defense of entrap-
ment is not based on accused's innocence. 
West's Ann.Evid.Code, § 501; West's 
Ann.Pen.Code,§ 1096. 
5. Criminal Law *"37 
If crime was suggested by another 
person, whether or not a law enforcement 
officer, for purpose of entrapment, the de-
fendant is not criminally liable. 
6. Criminal Law e=>661 
The People are not required to call 
any particular witness so long as the mate-
rial evidence relating to the charge against 
accused is produced in a manner according 
him a fair trial. 
7. Criminal Law *"700 
In view of fact that accused knew in-
former who was a participant in sale of 
LSD, and in view of fact that accused was 
present throughout series of events involv-
ing informer, knew what evidence would 
be available through informer's testimony, 
and could have called him as a witness, the 
People's failure to call informer could not 
be characterized as a suppression of evi-
dence. 
8. CrIminal Law *,,1171(1) 
Prosecutor's reference to marijuana 
during cross-examination of defendant ac-
cused of selling LSD did not amount to 
prejudicial rnisconduct~ where these refer-
ences are merely slips of tongue and prose-
cutor meant to ask about LSD. 
9. Criminal Law *"1137(5) 
Accused could not, complain on appeal 
of admission of testimony given by a de-
fense witness on direct examination, since 
accused was responsible for introduction of 
the evidence. 
10. Infants e=>69 
Even if accused waives application for 
probation and does not request referral to 
youth authority, trial court must on its 
own motion consider whether accused 
should be referred to the authority. 
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II. Criminal Law <$=01144(9) 
Absent showing that trial conrt failed 
to exercise its discretion to consider 
whether defendant should be referred to 
youth authority, it must be presumed that 
it did so. 
12. Criminal Law oS;>I93V2 
Conviction of a lesser included offense 
is an implied acquittal of the offense 
charged when the jury returns a verdict of 
guilty of only the lesser included offense. 
13. Criminal Law oS;>193'h 
'When jury expressly finds accused 
guihy of both greater and lesser offense, 
there is no implied acquittal of greater of-
fense. 
14. Criminal Law ~1209 
If evidence supports verdict as to 
greater offense, the conviction of that of-
fense is controlling, and the conviction of 
the lesser offense must be reversed. 
James W. Read, Jr., Costa Mesa, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for de-
fendant and appel\ant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William 
E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert T. 
Jacobs, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
PER CURIAM. 
An information charged defendant with 
selling lysergic acid diethylamine (herein-
after LSD) in violation of Health and 
Safety Code section 11912. At the trial 
the court instructed the jury on the lesser 
included offense of possession of LSD 
(Health & Saf.Code, § 11910.) The jury 
found defendant guilty of sale and posses-
sion of LSD. Defendant waived applica-
tion for probation, and the court sentenced 
him to the state prison for the term pre· 
scribed by law for the sale and to one year 
in the county jail for possession. It sus· 
pended execution of sentence on the pos· 
session conviction pending completion of 
service of sentence on the sale conviction, 
after which the suspension would become 
permanent. Defendant appeals. 
During June 1967, Agents David Fuentes 
and Robert L. Mooney of the Bureau of 
Narcotic Enforcement were working in the 
Orange County area with Robert J. Mc-
Nerney, a police informant At 4 :35 p.m. 
on June 13, 1967, the agents received a 
phone call from McNerney concerning a 
sale of drugs. The agents went to a shop-
ping center in Capistrano Beach. Shortly 
after they arrived, McNerney drove up and 
parked beside Agent Fuentes. Defendant 
was a passenger in McNerney's car. 
Agent Mooney was nearby. Agent 
Fuentes left his car and went over to 
McNerney. He talked briefly with Mc-
Nerney and then walked to defendant's 
side of the car. After a brief conversa-
tion, defendant handed 20 tablets to Agent 
Fuentes, who dropped $80 in defendant's 
lap. The tablets contained usable amounts 
of LSD. 
Defendant took the stand in his own de-
fense. He did not deny the sale but relied 
on the defense of entrapment. He testi-
fied that at the time of the sale he was 18 
years old. He lived with his grandmother 
in Fontana, where he worked for the tele-
phone company. He had stopped at a cafe 
in San Clemente while on his way to visit 
his mother in Carlsbad. Defendant had 
previously lived in San Clemente where he 
had gone to high school. McNerney was a 
friend and classmate who had lived near 
him in San Clemente. Leaving the cafe, 
defendant walked over to the pier where 
he met McNerney about 3 p.m. McNerney 
asked if defendant knew where he could 
buy LSD for a friend. McNerney ex-
plained that his friend asked him to obtain 
LSD and that he had been unable to do so. 
Defendant replied that he had none and 
did not know where to get any. Mc-
Nerney said he was upset by not being able 
to buy any for his friend, who needed the 
drug badly. 
A short time later McNerney returned 
and asked if defendant was certain he 
knew of no source of LSD. Defendant 
admitted having some tablets but said they 
were not for sale. McN eroey then sug-
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gested that defendant sell him a few so as a matter of law. "En~apment as a 
that his friend would let him alone. Me- matter of law is not established where 
Nerney appealed to their friendship, stat- there is any substantial evidence in the 
iog that if the roles were reversed he record from which it may be inferred that 
would help defendant. Defendant again the criminal intent to commit the particular 
refused, saying the tablets were for his offense originated in the mind of the ac-
own use, and the two parted. cused." (People v. Terry (1955) 44 Cal.2d 
As defendant was walking up the pier, 371, 372-373, 282 P.2d 19, 20.) From the 
MeN erney approached him a third time. evidence that defendant sold 20 tablets 
McNerney asked how many tablets defend- containing LSD to Fuentes and that de-
ant had, and defendant said ZO. McNerney fendant had the tablets in his possession 
stated that his friend needed only a few for two months the jury could infer that 
and would pay well. When McNerney the intention to sell the tablets originated 
. again appealed to their past friendship and in defendant's mind (see People v" Diaz 
said that he would sell defendant the tab- (l962) 206 Cal.App.2d 651, 671, 24 Cal. 
lets if their positions were reversed, de· Rptr. 367; disapproved on other grounds 
fendant agreed to sell all 20. McNerney in People v. Perez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 
said the friend would pay $80. 776, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934, fn. 2; 
The two then drove a short distance in 
McNerney's car to the location where de-
fendant had hidden the tablets. They 
picked up the LSD and then drove to the 
shopping center where they met Agent Fu-
entes. After a short conversation with 
McNerney, Fuentes asked defendant if he 
had the tablets. Defendant said "Yes," 
and Fuentes said, "Give them to me." De-
fendant handed the tablets to Fuentes, who 
dropped the $80 in his lap. 
Fuentes testified' that defendant said he 
had 20' tablets' and wanted $80 for them 
and that defendant was not hesitant in 
making the sale. Defendant testified that 
he knew it was a crime to possess LSD 
and that he had the tablets for two months 
before the sale. 
[1-3] Defendant contends that the evi-
dence establishes entrapment as a matter 
of law. The jury, however, was not re-
quired to believe his testimony that he was 
entrapped (People v. Benford (1959) 53 
Cal.2d I, 5, 345 P.2d 928), and the prosecu-
tion evidence does not establish entrapment 
J. "InSofar as any statute, except Section 
522, assigns the burden of proof in a 
criminal action, such statute is subject to 
Penal Code Section 1096." 
2. "A defendant in a criminal a~ion is pre-
sumed to be innocent until the contrary 
19 Hastings L.J. 825, 844). Moreover, de-
fendant's failure to call MeN emey as a 
witness supports an inference that his tes-
timony would not be favorable to defend-
ant. (Evid.Code, § 412.) 
[4] Defendant also contends that the 
recent enactment of the Evidence Code 
overturns the holding in People v. Val-
verde (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 318, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 528, that the defendant has the bur-
den of proving entrapment by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Evidence Code sec-
tion SOP subjects statutory burdens of 
proof in criminal cases to Penal Code sec-
tion 1096," which requires the prosecution 
to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The defendant's' burden 
to prove entrapment, however, 'is not sub-
j ect to Penal Code section 1096, for the de-
fense of entrapment in California is not 
based on the defendant's innocence. The 
courts have created the defense as a con-
trol on illegal police conduct "out of re-
gard for [the court's] own diguity, and in 
the exercise of its power and the perform-
ance of its duty to formulate and apply 
is proved, and- in case of a reasonable 
doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but 
the effect of this presumption is only to 
place upon the state the burden of prov-
ing him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
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proper standards for judicial enforcement 
of the criminal law." (People v. Benford, 
supra, 53 Cal.2d I, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933.) 
Moreover, this court acknowledged the 
continuing validity of the rule of the Val-
verde case in In re M. (1969) 70 A.c. 460, 
473, 75 Cal.Rptr. I, 450 P.2d 296, fn. 10.' 
[5] Defendant's contention that the 
trial court did not instruct the jury that a 
third party informer is to be treated as an 
agent of law enforcement officers for pur-
poses of entrapment is likewise without 
merit. The trial court properly instructed 
the jury that if the crime was suggested by 
another person, whether or not a law en-
forcement officer, for the purpose of en-
trapment, the defendant is not criminally 
liable.4 
[6, 7] Defendant contends that the 
prosecution's failure to call McNerney as a 
witness denied him his right to confront 
his accusers. The People are not required 
to call any particular witness so long as 
the material evidence relating to the 
charge against defendant is produced in a 
manner according him a fair trial. (Peo-
ple v. Kiihoa (1%0) 53 CaJ.2d 748, 752, 3 
CaJ.Rptr. I, 349 P.2d 673.) The failure of 
the People to call an informer may mani-
fest an intention to suppress material evi-
dence going to defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. To prevent such an abuse the Peo-
ple, when asked on cross-examination, must 
3. The Model Penal Code, section 2.13(2) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) also plnces 
the burden on defendant to prove entrap-
ment by a preponderance of the evidence. 
4. CALJIC No. 851 (Revised). "The law 
does not tolerate one per8on, particularly 
a law enforcement officer, generating in 
the mind of another person who is inno-
cent of any criminal purpose, the original 
intent to commit a crime thus inducing 
such person to commit a crime which he 
would not have committed or even con-
templated but for such induC€ment. 
"If the intent to commit the crime did 
not originate with the defendant and he 
was not carrying ont his own criminal 
purpose, but the crime was suggested by 
another person for the purpose of entrap-
ping and causing the arrest of the defend-
ant, then the defendant is not criminally 
disclose the identity of the in former or in-
cur a dismissal. (People v. Perez (1965) 
62 CaJ.2d 769, 773, 44 CaJ.Rptr. 326, 401 
P2d 934.) In the present case, however, 
defendant knew the informer, who was a 
participant in the sale. Defendant was 
present throughout the series of events in-
volving the informer, knew what evidence 
would be available through the infonner's 
testimony, and could have <:alled him as a 
witness. It is manifest that the People's 
failure to call McNerney cannot be charac-
terized as a suppression of evidence. 
[8] Defendant contends that the prose-
cuting attorney committed prejudicial mis-
conduct by referring to marijuana during 
the cross-examination of defendant. From 
the context of the questions, however, it is 
apparent that these references were merely 
slips of the tongue and that the prosecut-
ing attorney meant to ask about LSD. A 
prompt objection would have dispelled any 
possible confusion. No miscarriage of jus-
tice appears. (See People v. Watson 
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835, 299 P.2d 243.) 
[9] Defendant also contends that the 
trial court erred in admitting testimony 
that McNerney was perhaps a perjurer. 
Defendant does not explain how this testi-
mony could have prejudiced him. Further~ 
more, the testimony was given by a de-
fense witness on direct examination. 
Since defendant is responsible for the in-
liable for the acts so committed." (Italics 
added.) 
CALJIe No. 852 (Revised). "When 
law-enforcement officers are informed that 
a person intends to commit a crime, the 
law permits the officers to afford oppor-
tunity for the commission of the offense, 
and to lend the apparent cooperation of 
themselves or of a third per80n for the 
purpose of detecting the offender. When 
officers do this, if the suspect himself. 
originally and independently of the offi-
cers, intends to commit the acts constitut-
ing a crime, and if he does acts necessary 
to constitute the crime, he is guilty of 
the crime committed. He has no de-
fense in the fact that an officer or other 
person engaged in detecting crime was 
present and provided the opportunity, or 
aided or encouraged the commisson of 
the offense." (Italics added.) 
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troduction of the evidence, he cannot com- of both the greater and lesser offense, 
plain on appeal that its admission was eT- however, there is no implied acquittal of 
rOT. (See Witkin, Cal.. Evidence (2d ed. the greater offense. If the evidence Sup-
1966) § 1286, p. 1189.) ports the verdict as to a greater offense, 
[10] Defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in failing to exercise its discre-
tion to consider whether defendant should 
be referred to the California Youth Au-
thority. Defendant waived application for 
probation and did not request referral to 
the Youth Authority. IIi such cases, how-
ever, a trial court must on its own motion 
consider the referral of eligible defendants. 
(People v. Sparks (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 
597, 600, 68 Cal.Rptr. 909.) On this matter 
the record is silent. 
[11] It is presumed that official duty 
has been regularly performed. (Evid. 
Code, § 664.) The record shows that de-
fendant was 18 years old and shortly be-
fore trial had pleaded guilty to possession 
of marijuana. (Health & Saf.Code, § 
11530.) Although no probation report was 
prepared, the trial court had sufficient in-
formation upon which to exercise its dis-
cretion. In the absence of any showing to 
the contrary, we must presume that it did 
so. (People v. Sparks, supra, 262 Cal. 
App.2d 597, 600-601, 68 Ca1.Rptr. 909.) 
The trial court instructed the jury on the 
lesser included offense of possession of 
LSD. The last paragraph of its instruc-
tion read: "If the evidence is sufficient to 
support a finding of guilt of both the of-
fense charged and a lesser included of-
fense, but you entertain a reasonable doubt 
as to which offense the defendant is guilty, 
it is your duty to find -him guilty only of 
the lesser offense." (CALJIC No. 115 
(Revised).) The jury was not instructed 
that it should return only one verdict, and 
it found defendant guilty of both sale and 
possession of LSD. 
[12--14] Conviction of a lesser included 
offense is an implied acquittal of the of-
fense charged when the jury returns a ver-
dict of guilty of only the lesser included 
offense. (Gomez v. Superior Court (1958) 
50 Cal.2d 640, 645, 328 P.2d 976.) When 
the· jury expressly finds defendant guilty 
the conviction of that offense is control-
ling, and the convictio':1 of the lesser of-
fense must be reversed. (People v. Tide-
man (1962) 57 Cal.2d 574, 581-582, 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007; People v. Greer 
(1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 599, 184 P.2d 512.) 
The judgment of conviction of violation 
of Health and Safety Code section 11910 is 
reversed. The judgment of conviction of 
violation of Health and Safety Code sec-
tion 11912 is affirmed. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The trial court instructed the jury that 
"[i]f the intent to commit the crime did 
not originate with the defendant and he 
was not carrying out his own criminal pur-
pose, but the crime was suggested by an-
other person for the purpose of entrapping 
and causing the arrest of the defendant, 
then the defendant is not criminally liable 
for the acts so committed." (CALJIC No. 
851 (Revised).) The jury rejected the de-
fense and found defendant guilty. 
It is my opinion that the cases on which 
this instruction was based should be over-
ruled (see notes 1 and 2, infra) and that 
the issue of entrapment should be deter-
mined by the trial court. 
The theory of the defense of entrapment 
as it bears on the elements of the defense 
and the issue whether it presents a ques-
tion for the court or jury sharply divided 
the United States Supreme Court on the 
two occasions it confronted these problems. 
The court held that entrapment goes to the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. Accord-
ing to its test, if the intent to commit the 
offense originated in the accused's mind, 
entrapment cannot be established; if the 
intent originated in the mind of a law en-
forcement officer the defense is establish-
ed. The issue is for the jury to decide. 
(Sherman v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 
369, 78 S.C!. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848; Sorrells 
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v. United States (1932) 287 U.S. 435, 53 
S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413.) A minority of 
the Justices would permit the defense, not 
because the accused is innocent, but to pro-
tect the purity of government processes 
and to deter impermissible police conduct. 
In their view these policies, basic to the 
administration of justice, are for the court, 
not the jury, to enforce. (Sherman v. 
United States, supra, 356 U.S. 369, 378, 78 
S.Ct. 819 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
Sorrells v. United States, supra, 287 U.S. 
435, 453, 53 S.Ct 210 (Roberts, J., concur-
ring).) 
In 1959 this Court adopted the govern-
ment policy and police conduct theory of 
the defense. "[O]ut of regard for its own 
dignity, and in the exercise of its power 
and the performance of its duty to formu-
late and apply proper standards for judi-
cial enforcement of the criminal law, the 
court refuses to enable officers of the law 
to consummate illegal or unjust schemes 
designed to foster rather than prevent and 
detect crime." (People v. Benford (1959) 
53 Ca1.2d 1, 9, 345 P.2d 928, 933.) The 
I. People v. Francis (1969) 71 A.C. 69, 
81, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591; 
People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Cal.2d 27, 
49. 9 Cul.Rptr. 793. 357 P.2d 1049; Peo-
ple v. Tambini (1969) 275 A.C.A. 863, 
870, 80 Cal.Rptr. 179; People v. Chat-
field (1969) 272 A.C.A. 161, 168, 77 
Cal.Rptr. 118; People v. Dickerson 
(1969) 270 A.C.A. 382, 394. 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 828; People v. Glaser (1968) 265 
Cal.App.2d 849, 852, 71 Cal.Rptr. 706; 
People v. Sweet (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 
167, 170, 65 Cal.Rptr. 31; People v. 
Barone (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 776, 781, 
58 Cal.Rptr. 783; Los Robles Motor 
Lodge, Inc. v. Departmen t of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 
198, 206. 54 Cal.Rptr. 547; People v. 
Goree (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 304, 311, 
49 CaLRptr. 392; People v. Hicks (1963) 
222 Cal.App.2d 265, 270, 35 Cal.Rptr. 
149; People v. Tostado (1963) 217 Cal. 
App.2d 713, 719, 32 Cal.Rptr. 178; Peo-
ple v. Hawkins (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 
669, 672, 27 Cal.Rptr. 144; People v. 
Harris (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 613, 616, 
26 Cal.Rptr. 850; People v. Head (1962) 
208 Cal.App.2d 360, 366, 25 Cal.Rptr. 
124; People v. Cline (1962) 205 Cal 
App.2d 309, 311, 22 C.l.Rptr. 916; Peo-
court acknowledged that in the past Cali-
fornia courts placed at least as much em-
phasis on the susceptibility of the defend-
ant as on the propriety of the police meth-
ods (People v. Benford, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 1, 
9-10, 354 P.2d 928), but stated that now 
the court was primarily concerned with po-
lice conduct. (People v. Benford, supra, 
53 Ca1.2d 1, 13, 354 P.2d 928, fn. 5.) Nev-
ertheless, decisions since Benford repeated-
ly have used the origin of intent test for 
entrapment 1 and have committed the issue 
to the jury.! In so doing they have de-
parted from the rationale of the Benford 
case and seriously undermined the deter-
rent effect of the entrapment defense on 
impermissible police conduct 
Because the purpose of the defense is to 
control impermissible police conduct, "it is 
wholly irrelevant to ask if the 'intention' to 
commit the crime originated with the de-
fendant or government officers, or if the 
criminal conduct was the product of 'the 
creative activity' of law-enforcement offi-
cials." (Sherman v. United States, supra, 
356 U.S. 369, 382, 78 Cal.Rptr. 819, 825 
pie v. Burnett (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 
453, 456, 22 CaLRptr. 320; People v. 
Ortiz (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 250, 258, 
19 Ca1.Rptr. 211; People v. D'Agostino 
(1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 447, 463, 11 Cal 
Rptr. 847; People v. Valdez (1961) 188 
Cal.App.2d 750, 759, 10 Cal.Rptr. 664; 
People v. Rivers (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 
189, 192, 10 Cal.Rptr. 309; People v. 
Buckman (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 38, 51, 
8 Cal.Rptr. 765; People v. Haggard 
(1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 38, 44, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 898; People v. Serrano (1960) 180 
Cal.App.2d 243, 248, 4 C.I.Rptr. 470; 
see CALJIC No. 851 (Revised). 
2. People v. Mason (1969) 276 A.C.A. 473, 
475, 81 Cal.Rptr. 195; People v. Walters 
(1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 834. 845, 70 Cal. 
Rptr. 766; People v. Carter (1967) 251 
Cal.App.2d 400, 404, 59 Cal.Rptr. 394; 
People v. Hicks (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 
265, 270, 35 Cal.Rptr. 149; People v. 
Hawkins (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 669, 
672, 27 CaLRptr. 144; People v. Head 
(1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 360, 365, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 124; People v. Austin (1961) 198 
Cal.App.2d 186, 189, 17 Cal.Rptr. 782; 
People v. D'Agostino (1961) 190 Cal. 
App.2d 447, 462, 11 Cal.Rptr. 847. 
PEOPLE v. MORAN Cal. 769 
Cite 8.8 463 P.2d 763 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rotenberg, be determined by the jury have not dis-
The Police Detection Practice of Encour- cussed the significance of that case to that 
agement (1963) 49 Va.L.Rev. 871, 892- rule, and neither the pre-Benford (see, e. 
893.) Instead, the court must concern it- g., People v. Gutierrez (1954) 128 Cal. 
self with the activity it would seek to con- App.2d 387, 390, 275 P.2d 65) nor post-
trol. It must not lose sight of that purpose Benford cases have given any explanation 
by focusing on the character and conduct for the rule. 
of the accused. (See Remarks of Profes-
sor Paulsen, ALI Proceedings 1959, p. 
228.) 
Not all police conduct can be condemned, 
however, merely because it might tempt a 
person into crime. Criminal activity such 
as prostitution and traffic in narcotics nor-
mally does not bring complaints from its 
willing "victims." To enforce laws against 
such activities, an officer often must be-
come a seemingly willing participant in 
crime. (See Tiffany et al., Detection of 
Crime (1967) p. 209.) In so doing, how-
ever, he may not engage in methods that 
might induce persons to commit offense 
who would not otherwise do so, thereby 
manufacturing rather than preventing 
crime. 
The line must be drawn between meth-
ods likely to persuade those otherwise un-
willing to commit an offense from methods 
likely to persuade only those who are ready 
to do so. If the purpose of the defense of 
entrapment is to be achieved, the test must 
be objective and focus only on the methods 
used. In the case of traffic in narcotics, 
law-abiding citizens would not ordinarily 
be seduced into becoming involved in such 
traffic by an officer's offer to purchase 
them. Such an offer, howeve.r, is quite 
likely to lead to a sale when made to one 
prepared to sell. Accordingly, such an of-
fer without more would not constitute en-
trapment. If in addition, however, the of-
ficer· adopts methods of persuasion and in-
ducement that create a substantial risk that 
a person other than one ready to commit 
the crime solicited will commit the crime, 
the defense of entrapment is established. 
(See Model Pen. Code, § 2.13(1) (b) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962).) 
The post-Benford cases following the 
rule that the defense of entrapment should 
463 P.2d-49 
Under the rationale of the Benford case, 
submission of the issue to the jury cannot 
be justified on the ground that it goes to 
the defendant's guilt or innocence. The 
crucial issue is whether the court or the 
jury can best achieve the purpose of the 
defense: the deterrence of impermissible 
police conduct. A jury verdict of guilty or 
not guilty tells the police nothing about the 
jury's evaluation of the police conduct. A 
verdict of guilty may mean that the jury 
did not believe the defendant's testimony 
that would have established entrapment. It 
may also mean that the jury did not be-
lieve that the conduct created a substantial 
risk of inducing one not ready to commit 
the offense into doing so. Since the de-
fendant may assert entrapment and also 
deny that he committed the crime (People 
v. Perez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 769, 775-776, 44 
CaI.Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d 934), a "not guilty" 
verdict may also shed no light on the 
jury's assessment of police conduct. More-
over, even when the verdict settles the is-
sue of entrapment in the particular case, it 
"cannot give significant guidance for offi-
cial conduct for the future. Only the 
court, through the gradual evolution of ex-
plicit standards in accumulated precedents, 
can do this with the degree of certainty 
that wise administration of criminal justice 
demands." (Sherman v. United States, su-
pra, 356 U.S. 369, 385, 78 S.Ct. 819, 827. 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); accord, 
Model Pen.Code § 2.13(2) (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962).) In other areas involv-
ing police conduct, we have recognized the 
paramount importance of committing the 
assessment of such conduct to the court. 
Thus, the trial court, subject to appropriate 
appellate review, determines the admissibil-
ity of confessions and other evidence 
claimed to have been illegally obtained. 
(People v. Gorg (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 776, 
770 Cal. 463 PAOIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
780-781, 291 P.2d 469; Pen. Code, § 1538.-
5(c); Evid.Code, § 405; see Witkin, Cal. 
Evid. (2d 1966) § 492, pp. 462-463.) It 
should also determine the issue of entrap-
ment. 
PETERS and TOBRINER, JJ., concur. 
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UNITED STATES LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
HAIDINGER-HAYES, INC. and V. M. 
Hardinger, Defendants and 
Appellanis. 
L. A. 29620. 
Supreme Court ot California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 20, 1970. 
Action by insurer against corporate 
general agent and its president to recover 
damages on ground that defendants recom-
mended a poor insurance risk. The Supe-
rior Court, Los Angeles County, Walter H. 
Odemar, J" rendered judgment against de-
fendants, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, McComb, J'J held, inter alia, 
that evidence did not support finding that 
president was personally liable to insurer 
by reason of negligent performance of his 
corporate duties. 
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. 
Opinion, 71 Cal.Rptr. 721, vacated. 
I. Negligence 02;>1 
Actionable negligence involves a legal 
duty to use due care, a breach of such le-
gal duty, and the breach as the proximate 
or legal cause of the resulting injury. 
2. Principal and Agent <8=>61(1) 
A professional agent is required to 
have the particular knowledge and to exer-
cise the particular skill and diligence ex-
pected of it. 
3. Insurance 02;>83(1) 
If an insurance agent negligently in-
duces an insurer to assume coverage on 
which it suffers a loss the agent is liable, 
but liability is not incurred by a mere error 
of judgment in the exercise of discretion 
unless the error is based on want of care or 
diligence. 
4. Insurance <8=>83(1) 
In action by insurer against its general 
agent and its president, findings as to cus-
tom of brokers in the community in evalu-
ating "loss ratio" in determination of an 
appropriate premium rate were relevant to 
issue of degree of care and skill required 
of the agent. 
5. Insurance ~83(1) 
Evidence sustained finding that insur-
er's general agent was negligent in recom-
mending issuance of policy on terms and at 
rate which were used. 
6. Corporations ~306 
Directors and officers of a corporation 
are not personally liable on contract signed 
by them for and on behalf of the corpora-
tion unless they purport to bind themselves 
individually. 
7. Corporations ~306 
Directors or officers of a corporation 
do not incur personal liability for torts of 
the corporation merely by reason of their 
official position unless they participate in 
the wrong or authorize or direct that they 
be done, but they may be liable, under 
rules of tort and agency, for tortious acts 
committed on behalf of the corporation. 
8. ,Corporations ~306 
Directors or officers of corporation 
are not responsible to third persons for 
negligence amounting to merely nonfea-
sance, to a breach of duty owing to the 
corporation alone; the act must also con-
stitute a breach of the duty owed to the 
third person. 
